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NOTE
EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
TAKE CARE CLAUSE
Colleen E. O’Connor*
INTRODUCTION
The Obama administration announced a major immigration reform initiative in 2014, stating that it would refrain from taking deportation action
against undocumented immigrants who were parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents (“LPRs”). The Obama administration justified its
immigration initiative upon its authority to exercise executive nonenforcement discretion.1 In immigration and other contexts, the Take Care Clause,
stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”2 has been treated as a source of the President’s power to defer the
enforcement of the law.3
Exercising broad discretion not to enforce the law is a tempting solution
for the President to exert significant authority without turning to Congress.
In effect, the President can transform the reach of congressional laws to
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
Psychology and Women’s Studies, Duke University, 2014. I would like to thank Professor
Patricia Bellia for her persistent mentorship, guidance, and advice, and the members of
the Notre Dame Law Review for their thoughtful edits. I owe a special thanks to my parents
for introducing me to Notre Dame and the legal profession. All errors are my own.
1 See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to León Rodrı́guez, Dir. of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., et al. 2 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum] (“Deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by
which the Secretary deprioritizes an individual’s case for humanitarian reasons, administrative convenience, or in the interest of the Department’s overall enforcement mission . . . .
[I]t simply means that, for a specified period of time, an individual is permitted to be
lawfully present in the United States.”), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica
tions/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf.
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
3 While there are compelling policy arguments for and against Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), this Note does not seek to assess these programs from a
public policy or humanitarian standpoint. Rather, this Note seeks to use DAPA to analyze
how the executive branch must limit the exercise of its nonenforcement discretion if it is to
remain dedicated to its duty to faithfully execute the laws.
445
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achieve substantive policy goals.4 Pertaining to immigration, Congress
enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, stating that people
who enter the country illegally will be subject to deportation.5 Yet in the past
several years, the Department of Homeland Security announced two programs—Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) and Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(“DAPA”)—under the premise of prosecutorial discretion to justify not
enforcing deportation statutes against certain undocumented immigrants.6
DACA deferred deportation for individuals who came to the United States as
children yet never obtained citizenship or lawful status.7 DAPA proposed to
defer deportation for parents of U.S. citizens or LPRs who had no bridge to a
lawful status in the country.8
In anticipation of pushback, when the Department of Homeland Security announced DAPA, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an Opinion on DAPA’s legality (“OLC Opinion”).9 The OLC
Opinion established a multifactor framework for defining the scope of the
Executive’s enforcement discretion under the Take Care Clause to determine whether executive action effectively rewrote the laws or acted in conformity with congressional policy.10 While the OLC Opinion in many
regards is a poor attempt to provide guidance for the Executive acting under
the Take Care Clause, it provides a baseline that the Office of Legal Counsel
can build upon and use to assess other actions of enforcement discretion
beyond the context of immigration.
While DACA’s fate is still indeterminate,11 federal courts enjoined DAPA
during the Obama administration. The courts viewed DAPA as a rewriting of
4 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
671 (2014) (“The Obama Administration, for example, has announced policies of
abstaining from investigation and prosecution of certain federal marijuana crimes, postponing enforcement of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act, and suspending enforcement of removal statutes against certain undocumented immigrants.”).
5 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“Any alien who at
the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens
inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”).
6 See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2–3.
7 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., et al. 1 (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter
Napolitano Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutor
ial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
8 See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1.
9 The Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2014)
[hereinafter OLC Opinion].
10 See id. at 25–33.
11 There are two district court injunctions requiring President Trump to keep DACA
in place. See, e.g., Roque Planas & Elise Foley, Second Judge Blocks Trump Decision to End
Deportation Relief for Dreamers, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2018, 7:33 PM), https://www.huff
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the law,12 and President Trump later rescinded the deferred action program.13 When addressing DAPA’s legality, the Supreme Court requested
briefing on whether DAPA violated the Take Care Clause,14 yet avoided
defining the scope of the Take Care Clause in this instance of executive
inaction.15
Although DAPA never took effect, both immigration reform programs
demonstrate that President Obama was able to reshape federal policy and
narrow the reach of congressional legislation through his nonenforcement
discretion. By one account, out of the total 11.3 million undocumented
immigrants in the country, 1.2 million undocumented immigrants are eligible for DACA and 4.3 million would have been eligible for DAPA.16 An exercise of executive inaction would have amounted to temporary deportation
relief for almost half of the country’s undocumented immigrants. As presidents increasingly implement policy goals through strategic inaction, the
question arises as to when nonenforcement discretion runs up against the
President’s mandate to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”17
This question becomes increasingly important if the executive branch continues to make wide-ranging policy decisions under the guise of discretion.18
Part I of this Note will discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s
authority to regulate immigration and focuses on DACA and DAPA. Part II
will address the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel Opinion on DAPA’s legality. Part III will turn to the lack of judicial constraints on
or legislative responses to the executive branch’s enforcement discretion.
Part IV will propose that the executive branch should take a more active role
in ensuring that the President remains faithful to the Take Care Clause when
exercising prosecutorial discretion. Expounding upon the Office of Legal
ingtonpost.com/entry/daca-dreamers-second-judge-injunction_us_5a8366a4e4b02b66c51
301c5.
12 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
13 See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to James W.
McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Sept. 5, 2017) [hereinafter DACA Cancellation Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/
memorandum-rescission-daca.
14 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016) (“In addition to the questions
presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: ‘Whether the Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II,
§ 3.’”).
15 Although the Supreme Court requested briefing on the Take Care Clause, it ultimately did not address the Clause during oral argument or when rendering a decision.
The decision in whole stated that: “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”
Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272 (per curiam).
16 Texas, 809 F.3d at 148, 174 n.138.
17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18 There are additional concerns that Congress will continue to neglect reforming its
immigration scheme. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Thomas Kaplan, Congress Struggles for
Path Forward on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
02/16/us/politics/ congress-immigration-dreamers.html.
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Counsel’s multifactor framework is a solution for the executive branch to
police itself not just in the context of immigration, but any time the executive
branch broadly exercises its nonenforcement discretion.
I. THE PRESIDENT’S ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION—DACA
A.

AND

DAPA

The DHS’s Statutory Authority to Regulate Immigration

To understand executive nonenforcement in the contexts of DACA and
DAPA, it is necessary to briefly review immigration law. Congress enacted the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) and provided what is now
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) with the authority to remove
undocumented immigrants.19 The INA created a system of removal for
deportable immigrants20 and specified that certain classes of immigrants are
ineligible to receive visas and to be admitted into the United States.21 Congress delegated to the DHS a broad regulatory scheme pertaining to immigration.22 The Act announced that deportable immigrants generally
included immigrants who were “inadmissible at the time of entry, ha[d] been
convicted of certain crimes, or [met] other criteria set by federal law.”23 The
other criteria for deportation included undocumented immigrants who
failed to register or falsified documents; engaged in criminal activity endangering the public safety or national security; or voted unlawfully in violation
of federal, state, or local law.24 Congress tasked the DHS with initiating
removal proceedings and executing final orders of removal.25
B.

The DHS’s Removal Discretion

Despite the broad congressional mandate to remove undocumented
immigrants, full enforcement of the INA has proven to be implausible.
19 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). Prior to 2002, Congress vested power to enforce immigration laws in the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), but in 2002, Congress vested in the Department of Homeland Security the
power to enforce immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012) (“The Secretary of
Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens . . . .”).
20 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (“Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of
status was within one or more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at
such time is deportable.”).
21 Id. § 1182(a).
22 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (“It is not
necessary that Congress supply administrative officials with a specific formula for their guidance in a field where flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely
variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.” (quoting Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948))).
23 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012).
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(F)(3), (4), (6).
25 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 3.
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There are approximately 11.3 million undocumented immigrants in the
United States.26 One report estimates that it would cost an average of
$10,070 per person, or $114 billion total, to remove the entire population of
undocumented immigrants.27 The DHS only has the resources, however, to
remove less than 400,000 undocumented immigrants per year.28 Given the
breadth of the INA’s statutory prohibitions and the limitations of enforcement resources, agency discretion toward how resources are allocated is
inevitable.
The immigration structure critically depends on executive discretion.29
Congress expressly provided the DHS with discretion to “[e]stablish[ ]
national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”30 since the DHS
cannot act “against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with
enforcing.”31 The discretion to determine whether a violation of the law warrants action is rooted in the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”32 Given that many INA violations go
unpunished, it is critical to rely upon executive discretion to delay or suspend
removal.
The method of discretionary relief relevant to immigration law is known
as “deferred action.” The term deferred action refers to the temporary delay
in the removal of undocumented immigrants.33 Deferred action has been
used in a wide array of immigration contexts.34 Discretionary relief from
immigration has included victims of domestic violence under the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA),35 victims of human trafficking and certain
other crimes,36 foreign students impacted by Hurricane Katrina,37 widows or
widowers of U.S. citizens,38 and direct relatives of U.S. soldiers.39
26 Id. at 1.
27 Philip E. Wolgin, What Would It Cost to Deport 11.3 Million Unauthorized Immigrants?,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 18, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/im
migration/news/2015/08/18/119474/what-would-it-cost-to-deport-11-3-million-unauthor
ized-immigrants/.
28 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 1.
29 Price, supra note 4, at 681 (“As Congress well understands when it enacts federal
criminal proscriptions, both prosecutorial and sentencing discretion are inevitable because
of the broad reach of these proscriptions and the severity of authorized punishments.
Resource constraints as well as prudence dictate the conclusion that the federal criminal
law cannot be applied in its full rigor.” (quoting Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges,
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1423 (2008))).
30 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 402(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 202 (2012)).
31 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
32 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
33 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 12.
34 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2 & n.2.
35 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)–(iv) (2012).
36 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
37 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 16.
38 Id. at 17.
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Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents

The Obama administration premised two major immigration programs
on deferred action. The first directive, DACA, offered temporary deportation relief for immigrants who entered the United States as children and met
certain other specifications. The second directive, DAPA, extended deportation relief to parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs.
Turning to Obama’s first major immigration program, DACA, the DHS
announced on June 15, 2012, that it would defer the deportation of immigrants who came to the United States as children. The DHS set out specific
criteria to be eligible for DACA:
[An individual is eligible if he/she] came to the United States under the age
of sixteen; has continuously resided in the United States for at least five years
preceding the date of this memorandum and is present in the United States
on the date of this memorandum; is currently in school, has graduated from
high school, has obtained a general education development certificate, or is
an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the
United States; has not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a
threat to national security or public safety; and is not above the age of
thirty.40

While DACA conferred “no substantive right, immigration status or
pathway to citizenship,”41 individuals who met the criteria were eligible to
receive renewable deferred action for two years.42 After the two-year period,
DACA recipients could request a renewal if they continuously lived in the
United States and did not have a serious criminal conviction. Under
deferred action, the DHS promised not to initiate removal proceedings and
provided eligible candidates with temporary employment authorization in
the United States.43 This policy allowed the DHS to avoid expending limited
resources on low-priority undocumented immigrants and to shift the focus
toward individuals who posed a threat to the public.44
Turning to Obama’s second major immigration program, the DHS
announced DAPA on November 20, 2014. In a memorandum addressed to
several immigration administrative agencies, the Secretary of Homeland
39 See id. at 14–17. A spouse, parent, or child of a U.S. soldier who died “shall be
eligible for deferred action, advance parole, and work authorization.” Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2 n.2 (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1703(c)(1)(A), 117 Stat. 1392, 1694 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1151)).
40 Napolitano Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1.
41 Id. at 3.
42 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/USCIS/PIA-045, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) 3 (2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
43 See id. at 3–4.
44 See id. at 2.
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Security, Jeh Johnson, addressed two immigration policies. The memorandum first expanded certain parameters of DACA and then provided guidance for expanding deferred action to parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs.45
The memorandum first expanded DACA by removing the age cap to
allow for all immigrants who entered the United States before they turned
sixteen to be eligible for the program regardless of their age upon applying.
The memorandum then extended DACA renewal and work authorization to
three-year increments instead of two-year increments. Finally, the memorandum adjusted the date-of-entry requirement in which a DACA applicant must
have been in the United States from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010.46
The memorandum then extended deferred action to include parents of
U.S. citizens and LPRs who “have lived in the United States for five years or
longer if they register, pass a background check and pay taxes.”47 The DHS
set out specific criteria to be eligible for DAPA: the individuals must have a
child who is a U.S. citizen or LPR, have continuously lived in the United
States since January 1, 2010, be physically present in the United States on the
date of the memorandum and at the time of making a request for deferred
action, must not be an enforcement priority, and must not have any factors
that would make deferred action inappropriate.48 DAPA provided for renewable deferred action in three-year increments and permitted individuals to be
eligible for work authorization during the period of deferred action.49
The DHS premised both DACA and DAPA on prosecutorial discretion.
The DHS stated that it exercises prosecutorial discretion for “humanitarian
reasons, administrative convenience, or in the interest of the Department’s
45 The memorandum provided “guidance for case-by-case use of deferred action for
those adults who have been in this country since January 1, 2010, are the parents of U.S.
citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who are otherwise not enforcement priorities . . . .” Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3.
46 Id. at 3–4.
47 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Immigration
Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action.
48 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 4. Those eligible for DAPA are:
[I]ndividuals who: have, on the date of this memorandum, a son or daughter who
is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident; have continuously resided in the
United States since before January 1, 2010; are physically present in the United
States on the date of this memorandum, and at the time of making a request for
consideration of deferred action with USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services]; have no lawful status on the date of this memorandum; are not an
enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20, 2014 Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum; and present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the
grant of deferred action inappropriate.
Id.
49 See id. at 5; see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2018) (“An alien who has been
granted deferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which
gives some cases lower priority, [may apply for work authorization] if the alien establishes
an economic necessity for employment.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL110.txt

452

unknown

Seq: 8

notre dame law review

19-NOV-18

13:06

[vol. 94:1

overall enforcement mission.”50 Additionally, the Department relied upon a
scarcity rationale. The DHS indicated that it could not respond to all immigration violations due to its limited enforcement resources and it was therefore in the country’s best security and economic interests to defer action for
immigrants who are not enforcement priorities.51 DACA and DAPA demonstrated the DHS’s decision to decline from removing certain illegal immigrants for a period of time.52 Deferred action can be revoked at any time at
the discretion of immigration officials.53 Additionally, DAPA provided eligible immigrants with lawful presence in the United States.54 Lawful presence
allows immigrants to receive government benefits, such as social security benefits or Medicare.55 Lawful presence also ensures that the period of deferred
action does not count against individuals—whose cases were deferred by
DACA or DAPA—in future immigration proceedings.56
On November 20, 2014, in addition to announcing DAPA, the DHS
released a separate memorandum reflecting the Department’s removal priorities.57 The DHS reported three categories of priorities. The highest
immigration enforcement priority included undocumented immigrants who
were “threats to national security, public safety, and border security.”58 The
second-highest priority was undocumented immigrants convicted of several
misdemeanors.59 Finally, the third priority included undocumented immigrants who have been issued a final order of removal.60 The DHS indicated
that prosecutorial discretion was necessary to ensure that it devoted its lim50 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2; see also PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra
note 42, at 2 (“Deferred action is an exercise of this prosecutorial discretion to defer
removal action against certain individuals who are unlawfully present in the United States
in order to devote scarce enforcement resources to the highest priority removal cases,
including individuals who pose a danger to national security or public safety or have been
convicted of specific crimes.”).
51 See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3.
52 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1999) (“At
each stage the Executive has discretion to abandon [deferred action and the INS has
been] exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own
convenience.”).
53 See OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 13.
54 Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1753, 1763–64 (2016).
55 Id.; see also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 148–49 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per
curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
56 Bellia, supra note 54, at 1763–64; Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/frequentlyasked-questions (last updated Mar. 8, 2018).
57 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, et al. 1 (Nov. 20, 2014)
[hereinafter Prioritization Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publi
cations/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
58 Id. at 1.
59 Id. at 3–4.
60 Id. at 4.
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ited resources to top enforcement priorities.61 These enforcement priorities
remain uncontroversial and are viewed as a valid exercise of enforcement
discretion.62
In anticipation of challenges to DAPA’s legality, the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel released a memorandum opinion accompanying DAPA.63 In the opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that it
was legally permissible for the DHS to implement a deferred action policy for
parents of children who are either U.S. citizens or LPRs.64 Additionally, the
President addressed DAPA’s legality in remarks to the nation by stating:
“[T]here are actions I have the legal authority to take as President,” and
those actions are to “prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.”65
Despite these measures, DAPA immediately fueled controversy from the public and from Congress.66
Despite the executive branch’s precautionary measures, the courts soon
addressed the question of DAPA’s legality. Twenty-six states challenged
DAPA in court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Take
Care Clause.67 In an order issued on February 16, 2015, a Texas federal district court provided a preliminary injunction to prevent DAPA’s implementation.68 The district court’s decision rested on APA grounds in finding that
the states were likely to succeed on their claim that the DHS had created a
substantive rule without complying with the APA’s procedural requirements.69 The district court nonetheless expressly declined to address the
61 Id. at 2 (“DHS’s enforcement priorities are, have been, and will continue to be
national security, border security, and public safety. DHS personnel are directed to prioritize the use of enforcement personnel, detention space, and removal assets accordingly.”).
62 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (“But importantly, the states have not challenged the
priority levels [the Secretary] has established, and neither the preliminary injunction nor
compliance with the APA requires the Secretary to remove any alien or to alter his enforcement priorities.”). In the DHS Appropriations Act, Congress also instructed the DHS to
“prioritize the identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of
that crime.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 251
(codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S. Code).
63 See OLC Opinion, supra note 9.
64 Id. at 1–2.
65 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President
in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
66 For instance, Speaker John Boehner in a speech on the House floor quoted twentytwo times when Obama said he did not have the authority to pursue broad executive action
on immigration law without Congress. Boehner stated, “[w]e are dealing with a president
who has ignored the people, ignored the Constitution, and even his own past statements.”
Rebecca Shabad & Cristina Marcos, House Passes Bill to Defund Obama’s Immigration Orders,
HILL (Jan. 14, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/229469-house-votes-todefund-obamas-immigration-orders.
67 Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 604–07 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
68 Id. at 646–76.
69 Id. at 677.
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states’ constitutional claim under the Take Care Clause.70 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit, in affirming the preliminary injunction, also skirted the separation of powers question and failed to address the Take Care Clause.71 The
Fifth Circuit instead concluded that DAPA conflicted with the INA, which
“flatly does not permit the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of federal and
state benefits, including work authorization.”72
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the injunction against
the Obama administration’s immigration policy. It requested briefing on the
Take Care Clause in addition to the questions raised by the parties—“the
parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: ‘Whether the
Guidance violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 3.’”73
However, the Supreme Court ultimately did not address the Take Care
Clause when hearing oral argument or when rendering its decision. The
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling by an equally divided vote (4–4).74
The Court did not present substantive reasoning in its opinion, which stated
in whole that “[t]he judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”75
The Court’s lack of detail provided no clarity as to the Justices’ opinions on
the Take Care Clause question. In effect, the Court allowed states to stall
DAPA’s implementation.76
The Court, however, had no occasion to readdress the Take Care Clause
question before President Trump rescinded DAPA. On June 15, 2017, Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly issued a memorandum rescinding the
November 20, 2014, memorandum providing for DAPA and for DACA’s
expansion, yet leaving the June 15, 2012, DACA memorandum intact.77 The
70 Id.
71 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (“We find it unnecessary, at this early stage of
the proceedings, to address or decide the challenge based on the Take Care Clause.”).
The court affirmed the preliminary injunction based on its finding that DAPA violated
procedural requirements of the APA and substantive requirements of the INA. Id. at 170,
178, 186.
72 Id. at 184.
73 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906, 906 (2016).
74 There was a vacancy on the Court at the time, following Justice Antonin Scalia’s
death.
75 Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272. The Court also declined to rehear the case, “dooming . . .
President Obama’s plan to spare millions of undocumented immigrants from deportation.” Adam Liptak, Millions at Risk of Deportation as Justices Refuse to Rehear Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/us/politics/supreme-court-immigration-obama.html.
76 Peter M. Shane, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Big Immigration Case Wasn’t About Presidential
Power, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/
us-v-texas-wasnt-really-about-presidential-power/489047/.
77 Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin K. McAleenan,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., et al. 1–2 (June 15, 2017) [hereinafter
DAPA Cancellation Memorandum], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf.
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Secretary referenced President Trump’s new immigration enforcement priorities as relevant to his decision to rescind DAPA.78 Soon after his inauguration, President Trump directed federal agencies to “[e]nsure the faithful
execution of the immigration laws . . . against all removable aliens, consistent
with Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution.”79 Secretary Kelly
indicated that the “preliminary injunction in this matter, the ongoing litigation, the fact that DAPA never took effect, and our new immigration enforcement priorities” were all factors in his decision to rescind DAPA.80
Soon thereafter, President Trump rescinded DACA as well. On September 5, 2017, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine Duke issued a
memorandum rescinding the June 15, 2012, DACA memorandum.81 Duke
relied upon the Supreme Court’s and the Fifth Circuit’s rulings in Texas v.
United States along with a letter from the Attorney General to determine that
DACA should be terminated.82 In a letter to the DHS, the Attorney General
stated that DACA “was effectuated by the previous administration through
executive action, without proper statutory authority and with no established
end-date, after Congress’ repeated rejection of proposed legislation that
would have accomplished a similar result. Such an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the
Executive Branch.”83 DACA’s fate is uncertain, however, given several recent
district court injunctions requiring the Trump administration to keep DACA
in place.84
78 Id. at 1.
79 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also DAPA Cancellation Memorandum, supra note 77, at 1.
80 DAPA Cancellation Memorandum, supra note 77, at 3. In a press release issued the
same day, the Department of Homeland Security stated that Secretary Kelly rescinded
DAPA “because there [was] no credible path forward to litigate the currently enjoined
policy.” Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of Memorandum Providing for
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”)
(June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-action-parents-americans-and-lawful#.
81 DACA Cancellation Memorandum, supra note 13.
82 Id. (first citing Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015); and then citing
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam)).
83 Id.
84 As of November 2018, the Ninth Circuit is expected to render a judgment soon and
the Department of Justice filed a writ of certiorari before judgment to the Ninth Circuit
requesting the Supreme Court intervene in the California case and address DACA’s vitality.
See Pete Williams, Trump Administration Presses Supreme Court for Quick Action on DACA, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/trump-adminis
tration-presses-supreme-court-quick-action-daca-n931741; see also Alan Feuer, Citing
Trump’s ‘Racial Slurs,’ Judge Says Suit to Preserve DACA Can Continue, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/nyregion/daca-lawsuit-trump-brooklyn
.html (reporting that a federal district court judge in New York issued an injunction to
keep DACA in place); Michael D. Shear, Trump Must Keep DACA Protections for Now, Judge
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 01/09/us/trump-dacaimproper.html (explaining that a federal district court judge in California issued a nationwide injunction against DACA’s rescission in a separate lawsuit).
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LEGAL COUNSEL OPINION

During the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) released an opinion regarding DAPA, entitled “The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize
Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to
Defer Removal of Others” (“OLC Opinion”).85 The OLC primarily sought to
answer whether it was permissible for the DHS to extend deferred action for
(1) parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs and (2) parents of DACA recipients.86
The OLC concluded that while the deferred action policy for parents of U.S.
citizens and LPRs was a permissible exercise of the DHS’s enforcement discretion, deferred action for parents of DACA recipients was impermissible.87
The OLC Opinion recognized that enforcement discretion is rooted in
the Take Care Clause and necessarily involves an open-ended inquiry that
“does not lend itself easily to the application of set formulas or bright-line
rules.”88 Nonetheless, the OLC indicated there were four principles encompassing the scope of enforcement discretion under the Take Care Clause.
First, enforcement decisions should reflect “factors which are peculiarly
within [the enforcing agency’s] expertise.”89 Second, “the Executive cannot,
under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively
rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences.”90 Third, the Executive cannot “‘consciously and expressly adopt[ ] a general policy’ that is so extreme
as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”91 Fourth,
“non-enforcement decisions are most comfortably characterized as judicially
unreviewable exercises of enforcement discretion when they are made on a
case-by-case basis.”92 The OLC relied upon Heckler v. Chaney93 to draw out
these four principles, and stated that:
[A]ny expansion of deferred action to new classes of aliens must be carefully
scrutinized to ensure that it reflects considerations within the agency’s
expertise, and that it does not seek to effectively rewrite the laws to match
the Executive’s policy preferences, but rather operates in a manner consonant with congressional policy expressed in the statute.94

The OLC thus acknowledged that deferred action under the President’s duty
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed is not unlimited and estab85 OLC Opinion, supra note 9.
86 Id. at 1–2. The OLC Opinion also addressed the DHS’s prioritization policy and
found it to be a permissible exercise of the DHS’s discretion. Id. at 9–11.
87 Id. at 2.
88 Id. at 5.
89 Id. at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831
(1985)).
90 Id. (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833).
91 Id. at 7 (alteration in original) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4).
92 Id.
93 Heckler, 470 U.S. 821.
94 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 24.
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lished a four-factor inquiry to delineate whether a particular deferred action
program is constitutional.95
The OLC then applied the four-factor framework to the DHS’s proposal
to extend deferred action to parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs. In addressing
the first principle, whether the enforcement decision is within the scope of
the agency’s expertise, the OLC analyzed the DHS’s justifications for DAPA.
The DHS justified DAPA on two grounds: (1) the resource constraints of
removing undocumented immigrants from the country and (2) the humanitarian interest of keeping parents with their children who are lawfully present
in the United States. The OLC found that the DHS satisfied the first principle because determining how to address resource constraints and humanitarian concerns are both within the DHS’s expertise.96
In addressing the second principle, whether the Executive attempts to
effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences, the OLC found
that the DHS’s proposal to extend deferred action to parents of U.S. citizens
and LPRs was in harmony with congressional policy. The OLC specified that
the DHS’s proposal “track[ed] a congressional concern, expressed in the
INA, with uniting the immediate families of individuals who have permanent
legal ties to the United States.”97 Since the DHS’s program did not grant
parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs any legal rights to remain in the United
States and the parents were low deportation priorities, the OLC reasoned,
DAPA did not circumvent the INA.98
Turning to the third principle, whether the Executive adopts a policy
effectively abdicating its statutory responsibilities, the OLC considered the
Agency’s “severe resource constraints” and removal priorities.99 The OLC
observed that the DHS’s resource constraints restricted the Agency in its
removal power and that the Agency’s proposed program deferred the
removal of undocumented immigrants near the bottom of the Agency’s
enforcement priorities.100 The OLC explained that since immigration officials made deferred action determinations on a case-by-case basis, the DHS
avoided concerns that it either abdicated its statutory responsibilities or created a categorical entitlement to deferred action for immigration relief.101
95 Id. (explaining that congressional intent “help[s] to inform [the DHS’s] consideration of whether the proposed deferred action programs are ‘faithful[ ]’ to the statutory
scheme Congress has enacted.” (third alteration in original) (citing U.S. CONST. art II,
§ 3)).
96 Id. at 26 (“Like determining how best to respond to resource constraints, determining how to address such ‘human concerns’ in the immigration context is a consideration
that is generally understood to fall within DHS’s expertise.” (quoting Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012))).
97 Id. at 27.
98 Id. at 27–28; see also Prioritization Memorandum, supra note 57.
99 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 28.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 29 (“[A] categorical entitlement to deferred action . . . could raise concerns
that DHS is either impermissibly attempting to rewrite or categorically declining to enforce
the law with respect to a particular group of undocumented aliens.”).
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The OLC Opinion established that the DHS satisfied the third principle and
did not abdicate its statutory responsibilities by deferring removal for parents
of U.S. citizens and LPRs.
Finally, the OLC addressed the fourth principle: whether the Agency
exercised discretion on a case-by-case basis. The OLC determined that the
DHS’s proposed program provided for “the exercise of case-by-case discretion, thereby avoiding creating a rule-like entitlement to immigration
relief.”102 Indeed, the proposed program “would resemble in material
respects the kinds of deferred action programs Congress ha[d] implicitly
approved in the past.”103
Additionally, the OLC Opinion considered whether the proposed program would be problematic given its size, since the proposed program would
apply to approximately four million of the 11.3 million undocumented immigrants.104 It found that the size of the program was unproblematic because
“only a fraction” of undocumented immigrants would be eligible and
because “Congress has granted a prospective entitlement to lawful status
without numerical restriction.”105
After the OLC concluded that the DHS’s proposed deferred action program for parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs was permissible, it determined
that the DHS’s proposed deferred action program for parents of DACA
recipients was impermissible. The OLC focused on two differences between
the programs. First, it asserted that deferred action for parents of DACA
recipients would amount to an expansion of family-based immigration
relief.106 It indicated that the INA does “not express . . . concern for uniting
persons who lack lawful status.”107 Second, it indicated that there was no
precedent or implicit congressional approval for extending deferred action
to parents of DACA recipients.108 Extending deferred action to parents of
DACA recipients had no stopping point, and opened the door to extending
deferred action to any relative of DACA recipients.109
Ultimately, the OLC’s four-factor framework did not prevent DAPA from
being challenged and rescinded. However, the OLC’s four-factor framework
for evaluating the validity of an executive’s enforcement discretion has
broader implications for how the Take Care Clause constrains enforcement
discretion, which this Note will discuss below.
102 Id. at 31.
103 Id. at 29.
104 Id. at 30.
105 Id. at 30–31.
106 Id. at 32 (“First, although DHS justifies the proposed program in large part based
on considerations of family unity, the parents of DACA recipients are differently situated
from the parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs under the family-related provisions of . . . immigration law . . . . [T]he immigration laws do not express comparable concern for uniting
persons who lack lawful status . . . with their families.”).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 32–33.
109 Id. at 33.
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The Take Care Clause is understood simultaneously as a source of executive enforcement discretion and as an obligation to ensure that the executive branch executes Congress’s laws.110 Since broad categorical
prosecutorial discretion has played a significant role in presidential action,
there is a potential limiting principle suggested by the Take Care Clause.
This Part evaluates whether the courts or Congress cabin executive enforcement discretion. This Part first looks at the Supreme Court’s deference
toward executive discretion and then turns to Congress’s inaction toward
deferred action.
110 Many scholars have addressed the scope of the Take Care Clause through the lens
of executive nonenforcement. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation
of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1723 (2016) (discussing the Obama
Administration’s executive discretion with regards to the Affordable Care Act and stating
that “[t]he Administration thus used the public announcements of its nonenforcement
policies to encourage the regulated community to disregard provisions of the ACA. Prospectively licensing large groups of people to violate a congressional statute for policy reasons is inimical to the Take Care Clause.”); Bellia, supra note 54, at 1756 (“This Article uses
DAPA to explore the tension between the discretion-granting and discretion-limiting features of the Faithful Execution Clause.”); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:
The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013) (arguing that there is no presidential nonenforcement power, rather the Take Care Clause imposes a duty on the President to enforce all
congressional laws and that the Obama administration breached its constitutional duty by
refusing to enforce immigration laws); Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement
Discretion in the Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255 (2013); Jack Goldsmith
& John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2016)
(“Through a long and varied course of interpretation, however, the Court has read that
vague but modest language [in the Take Care Clause] . . . either as a source of vast presidential power or as a sharp limitation on the powers of both the President and the other
branches of government.”); Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the
Law: A Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1525 (2018) (“[C]an nonenforcement violate the Take Care Clause and, if so, when? . . . [I]f the executive branch can
simply refuse to enforce a statute because the President disagrees with the legislature’s
policy choice, Congress’s powers may be negated. Can that outcome be reconciled with
the Take Care Clause?” (footnote omitted)); Price, supra note 4, at 675–76 (“The requirement of ‘faithful[ ]’ execution in the Take Care Clause invites inquiry into the proper
scope and rigor of law enforcement that a ‘faithful’ executive agent should perform . . . .
The executive branch thus exceeds its proper role, and enters the legislature’s domain, if
without proper congressional authorization it uses enforcement discretion to categorically
suspend enforcement or to license particular violations.” (alteration in original)); David S.
Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583
(2017); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 670 (1985) (“The ‘take Care’ clause is a duty, not a license; it imposes an obligation on the President to enforce duly enacted laws. If judicial involvement is based on a
statutory violation by the executive, review promotes rather than undermines the separation of powers, for it helps to prevent the executive branch from ignoring congressional
directives.”); Symposium, The Bounds of Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 1587, 1677–1949 (2016).
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Judicial Deference to Executive Inaction

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Take Care Clause as a source of
executive enforcement power.111 Through a series of cases, courts have
relied upon the Take Care Clause to justify the President’s far-reaching
prosecutorial discretion and have done little to interfere.112 The Court has
effectively abdicated its role of judicial review in demonstrating its unwillingness to evaluate an executive nonenforcement decision.113
Most relevantly, in Heckler v. Chaney,114 the Court linked enforcement
discretion with the Take Care Clause.115 In this case, death row inmates petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) arguing that the states’ use
of drugs for human execution violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (“FDCA”), and requested that the FDA take enforcement actions to prevent the FDCA violations.116 The Court declined to require the FDA to exercise its enforcement power against drugs used for human executions.117 It
reasoned that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether
through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an
agency’s absolute discretion” and the “presumption is that judicial review is
not available.”118 In concluding that an agency’s decision to abstain from
enforcement action is presumptively immune from judicial review, the
Court’s understanding of prosecutorial discretion under the Take Care
Clause informed its interpretation. The Court stated that:
111 See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 110, at 1837 (“[T]he Court has treated the
Take Care Clause as the source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion—a power that,
as recent events have shown us, may give the President room to reshape the effective reach
of laws enacted by Congress.”); cf. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 110, at 610
(“[T]he parameters of [the Take Care Clause] are murky. On some occasions, the Court
has conjured the Take Care Clause for the proposition that the President cannot suspend
or supersede Congress’s laws; at other times, however, the Court has cited the Take Care
Clause as the fount of inherent prosecutorial discretion.”).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821 (1985); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
113 See Price, supra note 4, at 683 (“Courts, indeed, have disclaimed virtually any authority to review executive charging decisions.”). See generally Abby L. Timmons, Note, Too
Much of a Good Thing: Overcrowding at America’s National Parks, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (discussing the Court’s unwillingness to intervene when the Bureau of
Land Management, a federal agency that administers public lands, refused to take action
against all-terrain vehicle use on federal lands because the Court found it was a matter of
agency discretion).
114 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
115 Notably, there has been much scholarly attention on Heckler v. Chaney and how the
Court has invoked the Take Care Clause to find that the Executive has broad prosecutorial
discretion. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 110, at 1847–48; Peter L. Markowitz,
Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489,
506–07 (2017); Price, supra note 4, at 684.
116 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 821.
117 Id. at 827.
118 Id. at 831.
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[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to
indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special province of
the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”119

The Court also explained that an agency is better able than a court to
balance the factors that contribute to a decision not to enforce.120 These
factors include “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at
all.”121 The Court then deferred to Congress to determine whether executive nonenforcement should be reviewed by the courts.122 In sum, Heckler v.
Chaney created a presumption that agencies exercising nonenforcement discretion are immune from judicial review and provided agencies with wide
latitude to make nonenforcement determinations.123
Likewise, in United States v. Armstrong,124 the Court invoked the Take
Care Clause to justify unreviewable agency discretion. The Armstrong Court
declined a request for discovery on a claim of selective prosecution125 and
reasoned that the “Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain
‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.”126 The Court recognized that prosecutorial discretion included balancing factors such as “the
strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan.”127 The Court went on to explain that U.S.
Attorneys “have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the
President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”128 While the Court ulti119 Id. at 832 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
120 Id. at 831–32 (“[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise . . . . An agency
generally cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables
involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”).
121 Id. at 831.
122 Id. at 833, 838 (“[W]e essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to whether an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially reviewable [and] Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement power if it wishes,
either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”).
123 See Louis W. Fisher, Executive Enforcement Discretion and the Separation of Powers: A Case
Study on the Constitutionality of DACA and DAPA, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 131, 149–50 (2017).
124 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
125 Id. at 456–57.
126 Id. at 464 (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
127 Id. at 465 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607).
128 Id. at 464 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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mately relied upon the Equal Protection Clause, the Court treated the Take
Care Clause as a source of prosecutorial discretion.
More recently in Association of Irritated Residents v. EPA,129 the D.C. Circuit declined to review the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) agreements with animal feeding operations (“AFOs”),130 holding that the
agreements were valid nonenforcement actions.131 In this case, community
members and environmental groups petitioned the EPA to control AFOs’
pollution and odors.132 Since the EPA had no precise method of measuring
AFO emissions, the EPA entered into consent agreements with AFOs. The
condition for the agreements was that each AFO would “assist in developing
an emissions estimating methodology” in exchange for the EPA’s nonenforcement of violations against the AFOs for a specified period of time.133
The court agreed with the EPA that the consent agreements were an exercise
of enforcement discretion rather than an exercise of rulemaking. The court
reasoned that the “EPA’s ‘cabining’ of its ability to sue AFOs for a period of
time is not based on a substantive interpretation of the statutes, but rather is
a way to defer enforcement of those substantive interpretations until EPA has
determined how their requirements apply in the particular case of AFOs.”134
The court then concluded that the “EPA’s exercises of its enforcement discretion are not reviewable by this court.”135 Once again, a federal court indicated that once an action is classified as an exercise of enforcement
discretion, the agency essentially gets a “pass” to do as it pleases.
While there have been challenges to executive enforcement discretion,
the courts have emphatically declined to address the bounds of the Take
Care Clause.136 The courts have cited the Take Care Clause to justify executive nonenforcement discretion, but when courts found that enforcement
discretion went too far, they evaded defining the Clause’s parameters. As
discussed above, in United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court requested briefing on the scope of executive nonenforcement.137 The United States
asserted that the Take Care Clause is nonjusticiable and that the Executive
129 494 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
130 AFOs are facilities that house animals to be processed for human consumption. Id.
at 1028.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1029. The AFOs were able to avoid liability for violations of the Clean Air Act;
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Id.
134 Id. at 1034.
135 Id. at 1037.
136 The courts have a history of answering large separation of powers questions narrowly. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (deciding a narrow issue of
whether detention is lawful of a U.S. citizen captured overseas as an enemy combatant);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“And court decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with
the largest questions in the most narrow way.”).
137 See supra Section I.C.
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was faithfully executing the law by allocating resources in a permissible
way.138 Texas disagreed, explaining that the government failed to provide
for any limiting principle on executive action.139 After briefing and oral
argument, the Court declined to address the Take Care Clause when it issued
its per curiam decision.140 United States v. Texas is another example of the
courts’ tendency to sidestep the scope of the President’s constitutional mandate to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
B.

Congressional Inaction Towards Executive Nonenforcement

While the Supreme Court indicated that Congress may limit an agency’s
enforcement power,141 Congress has not provided constraints or guidance
on executive enforcement discretion.142 The Supreme Court stated that “we
essentially leave to Congress, and not to the courts, the decision as to
whether an agency’s refusal to institute proceedings should be judicially
reviewable” and that “Congress may limit an agency’s exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases
it will pursue.”143
Despite Congress’s awareness of deferred action, it has not acted to limit
the practice.144 For instance, in 2011, Congress considered a bill to temporarily suspend deferred action except under certain circumstances. The Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation Act proposed to suspend
the executive branch’s authority to grant deferred action for immigrants
except for humanitarian or security purposes.145 Despite these efforts,
neither the House nor the Senate voted on the bill.
In addition, Congress expressly gave the DHS the discretion to establish
immigration enforcement priorities and recognized that the DHS cannot act
against every technical violation of Congress’s immigration laws.146 Congress
has demonstrated an awareness and implicit approval that deferred action
would be available to certain undocumented immigrants, such as VAWA peti138 Brief for Petitioners at 73–74, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per
curiam) (No. 15-674).
139 Brief for State Respondents at 72, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674).
140 Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272.
141 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).
142 See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 110, at 623 (“[T]he Court has provided
only sporadic and somewhat fuzzy parameters on what the President’s duty to ‘faithfully
execute the law’ entails.”).
143 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833, 838; see also Price, supra note 4, at 684 (“In the civil context,
courts have indicated that, at least theoretically, Congress could regulate executive
enforcement discretion.”).
144 See Markowitz, supra note 115, at 540–44.
145 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 18 n.9 (citing H.R. 2497, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.
2011); S. 1380, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011)).
146 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 402(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2178
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 202 (2012)).
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tioners and T and U visa applicants.147 At times, Congress has also indicated
that some immigrants should be eligible for deferred action, including
immediate family members of LPRs killed on September 11, 2001 and family
members of U.S. citizens killed in combat.148 Congress has thus repeatedly
acknowledged the DHS’s use of deferred action for undocumented immigrants, yet has failed to provide any real constraints on the President’s use of
deferred action. There is the potential for the executive branch to abuse its
Take Care power, provided that there has been a historical practice for judicial and legislative branches to not constrain executive power.149
IV. EXPANDING

THE

OLC’S FRAMEWORK TO CABIN
ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

THE

EXECUTIVE’S

While the Take Care Clause is a fount of inherent executive enforcement discretion, this discretion goes too far when it is unfettered by any tangible constraints. Since court guidance is sparse150 and Congress has had
little to say about limiting the Executive’s use of deferred action, it remains
unclear as to what the exact parameters of the President’s duty to faithfully
execute the laws are. Under the Take Care Clause, the President has the
duty to take care that the law is faithfully executed, implying some constitutional constraints on the President’s ability not to enforce the law under the
guise of prosecutorial discretion. While prosecutorial discretion may well be
“an ‘exclusive authority’ of the executive branch,”151 the Take Care Clause
may provide some internal constraints.152 This Part considers how the OLC’s
DAPA framework can be enhanced to account for the constraints on executive enforcement discretion embedded in the Take Care Clause and can be

147 See OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 18–19 (“Congress has long been aware of the
practice of granting deferred action, including in its categorical variety, and of its salient
features; and it has never acted to disapprove or limit the practice. On the contrary, it has
enacted several pieces of legislation that have either assumed that deferred action would
be available in certain circumstances, or expressly directed that deferred action be
extended to certain categories of aliens.”); see also Price, supra note 4, at 760.
148 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 19.
149 Cf. Price, supra note 4, at 687 (“In an era of partisan polarization and legislative
gridlock, Presidents often cannot count on Congress to develop legislative solutions to
perceived problems, or even to negotiate over such solutions in good faith . . . . Reliance
on all forms of executive authority, without resort to Congress, thus becomes a nearly irresistible temptation for modern Presidents.” (footnote omitted)).
150 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has
exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”).
151 Price, supra note 4, at 685.
152 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1613
(2016) (“With respect to the acquisition of information, the executive branch is usually in
a far better position than the legislative and judicial branches.”).
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used in future situations where the Executive broadly exercises enforcement
discretion.153
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer154 provides a lens through which
to view the Executive’s power as self-controlling. In Youngstown, the Court
held unconstitutional President Truman’s action to take possession of the
country’s steel mills during the Korean War.155 Youngstown, much like the
DAPA litigation, involved claims that there was insufficient presidential
authority to act under Article II.156 Justice Jackson’s enduring concurrence
provides a framework for the Executive’s abuse of power.157 Jackson critiqued the executive branch’s argument that past presidential practice authorized the steel mill seizure.158 He was critical of the advice given to President
Truman that he had authority to seize the country’s steel mills and asserted
that it was advice never given nor taken by President Roosevelt.159 Jackson
claimed that presidential action requires focusing on how that power has
been used in the past and how it could be used by the executive branch in
the future.160 Jackson’s message to the executive branch was one “of prudence and stewardship in the exercise of power.”161
It is not a coincidence that the district court in Texas v. United States cited
to Jackson’s message in its opinion that the Obama administration overstepped its executive authority.162 The district court in Texas v. United States
153 Cf. Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911 (2016) (arguing that the
Court should assume a role in reviewing and policing presidential inaction).
154 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
155 Id. at 587–89.
156 Patricia Bellia, Executive Power After United States v. Texas, REG. REV. (July 20, 2016),
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/07/20/bellia-executive-power-after-united-states-tex
as/.
157 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 648–49.
159 Id. (“The Solicitor General, acknowledging that Congress has never authorized the
seizure here, says practice of prior Presidents has authorized it. He seeks color of legality
from claimed executive precedents, chief of which is President Roosevelt’s seizure of June
9, 1941, of the California plant of the North American Aviation Company. Its superficial
similarities with the present case, upon analysis, yield to distinctions so decisive that it cannot be regarded as even a precedent, much less an authority for the present seizure.”);
Bellia, supra note 156.
160 Bellia, supra note 156 (“Stewardship of the presidency requires attention not only to
the policy goals of its current occupant, but also to the accretion of power that overly
broad assertions of executive authority will generate for future administrations.”).
161 Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES
233, 282 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
162 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 663–64 (S.D. Tex. 2015); aff’d per curiam
by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (“Past action previously taken by the DHS
does not make its current action lawful. President Truman in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, similarly sought ‘color of legality from claimed executive precedents,’ arguing
that, although Congress had not expressly authorized his action, ‘practice of prior Presidents has authorized it.’ The Supreme Court firmly rejected the President’s argument
finding that the claimed past executive actions could not ‘be regarded as even a precedent,
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cited to Youngstown as an example of how past practice by the executive
branch does not create a source of power for future action.163 The court
sought to reaffirm the principle that presidential action, or inaction, requires
a consideration of how that power may be aggrandized by the executive
branch in the future. In the case of DAPA, sweeping assertions of executive
enforcement discretion could feed into broad presidential power to make
policy decisions in the future.164
Jackson’s concurrence also acknowledged that congressional inaction
would expand presidential power absent judicial intervention.165 Jackson
noted that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility.”166 He commented on the Solicitor General’s
argument about the Commander-in-Chief Clause by stating that “[w]hile
broad claims under this rubric often have been made, advice to the President
in specific matters usually has carried overtones that powers, even under this
head,” are narrower and “[e]ven then, heed has been taken of any efforts of
Congress to negative [the President’s] authority.”167 Jackson’s message to
Congress also rings true with regard to DAPA. Congress has ceded power to
the executive branch by leaving a wide gap between the INA and the actual
enforcement of the law by the executive branch.168 In the immigration context, the executive branch needs to police itself because Congress and the
courts will not do so otherwise. Jackson’s concern that congressional complacency will deteriorate limits on executive power has materialized in DAPA.169
The OLC offered a multiprong functional framework in an attempt to
cabin enforcement discretion exercised through the deferred action immigration programs.170 While the OLC framework falls short of providing a set
of limiting principles for the executive branch to constrain itself,171 if the
much less an authority for the present [action].’” (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 649
(Jackson, J., concurring))).
163 Id.
164 Bellia, supra note 156.
165 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”).
166 Id.; Bellia, supra note 161, at 276–77 (“Justice Jackson’s critique is truly an intraexecutive branch critique rather than a judicial critique, pitting the claims of current advisors to President Truman against the narrower claims of advisors past.”).
167 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645; Bellia, supra note 161, at 276.
168 See Bellia, supra note 156.
169 See id.
170 See supra Part II.
171 See generally Bellia, supra note 54; Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I:
Congressional Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 96 (2015); Josh Blackman,
The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213
(2015); Recent Executive Opinion: Immigration Law—Office of Legal Counsel Issues Opinion
Endorsing President Obama’s Executive Order on Deferred Action for Parental Accountability—The
Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Pre-
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framework is enhanced, it could provide a blueprint for the OLC to check
agency enforcement discretion. This framework can provide practical constraints on the executive branch to ensure that it does not skirt its duty to
faithfully execute congressional legislation. Federal agencies should consult
the OLC before making general policy decisions premised on executive nonenforcement discretion so the OLC can provide a public report with its
enhanced four-factor analysis.
The first principle of the OLC’s DAPA framework stated that enforcement decisions should reflect factors within the scope of the agency’s expertise.172 The OLC indicated that the factors may include “whether the agency
has enough resources to undertake the action,” “whether agency resources
are best spent on this violation or another,” “the proper ordering of [the
agency’s] priorities,” and “the agency’s assessment of ‘whether the particular
enforcement action [at issue] best fits the agency’s overall policies.’”173 In a
thin analysis, the OLC concluded that the DHS satisfied this principle by
considering resource constraints and humanitarian interests, both within the
Agency’s expertise.
In order to cabin enforcement discretion and determine the scope of
the agency’s expertise, the OLC should first interview agency officials and
employees. The OLC can inquire about agency practices and overall agency
efficiency to explore what avenues are available before the executive branch
exercises broad enforcement discretion. The OLC should analyze each factor it mentioned in turn—agency resources generally, the allocation of
resources specifically, the proper ordering of the agency’s priorities, and the
agency’s overall policies. Additionally, the OLC should assess in detail the
agency budget constraints both before and after an enforcement decision
would take effect. This way, the OLC can make a reasoned decision as to
whether the enforcement decision reflects considerations within the agency’s
expertise.
The second principle of the OLC’s DAPA framework stated that the
Executive’s enforcement decisions cannot attempt to effectively rewrite the
laws to match its policy preferences.174 The agency’s enforcement decisions
should be in accord with congressional policy underlying the statutes Congress charges the agency with administering. The OLC found that DAPA was
consonant with the congressional policy underlying the INA because
“[n]umerous provisions of the [INA] reflect a particular concern with uniting aliens with close relatives who have attained lawful immigration status in
the United States.”175
sent in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. (Nov. 19, 2014), 128
HARV. L. REV. 2320 (2015) [hereinafter Recent Executive Opinion].
172 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 6.
173 Id. at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32
(1985)).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 26.

R
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To provide for more robust constraints on executive inaction, the OLC
should first compare the executive nonenforcement policy alongside the text
of the statute it purports to align with. In order to properly consider whether
an enforcement decision is a rewriting of the law, the OLC should examine
the congressional history, legislative debates, statutory text, and any amendments made thereafter. Next, the OLC should take into account what legal
rights the executive policy affords individuals that the statutory text does not.
Finally, in considering whether the nonenforcement policy is a rewriting of
the law, the OLC should consider the statute’s broad goals and grapple with
whether the policy aligns with those goals. Holistically, the OLC should consider whether the lack of fidelity to the precise text of the statute varies so far
that there is a Take Care Clause violation, something the OLC never did in
the OLC Opinion.
With regard to immigration, the OLC should have compared DAPA
alongside the text of the INA. In its opinion, the OLC did not properly grapple with whether DAPA’s grant of lawful presence violated the Act. It failed
to address separately whether forbearance, lawful presence, or work authorization violated the INA. The INA specifies that the cancellation of removal
can occur for a maximum of 4000 undocumented immigrants a year.176 The
INA also reserves visas for parents of U.S. citizens, but the citizen has to be at
least twenty-one years old and the parent generally must not have previously
held an unlawful presence in the United States.177 If the OLC directly compared DAPA with the INA, it would find that DAPA was directly contradictory
to the INA’s explicit numerical and age requirements for immigrants to
remain in the country.
It would be sensible for the OLC to address whether DAPA lacked fidelity to the INA. While DAPA does not grant lawful status, unlike the cancellation of removal and visa statutory sections, DAPA’s forbearance from removal
provided immigrants with lawful presence in the United States, which paused
the accrual of unlawful presence and allowed immigrants to be able to benefit from governmental programs.178 If the executive branch was acting with
prudence, it would have taken a closer look at the INA and would have found
that the gap between the INA and DAPA is too large to sustain.
Additionally, the OLC failed to adequately grapple with the notoriously
complex congressional immigration goals. Rather than handpick particular
INA provisions or provide general justifications for the Executive’s action,179
it would be beneficial if the OLC demonstrated in detail how the President’s
proposed program aligns with congressional policy and why there are no viable alternatives. In order to grapple with whether agency inaction conforms
176 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) (2012).
177 Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
178 See Bellia, supra note 54, at 1762–65.
179 Adam Cox & Cristina Rodriguez, Executive Discretion and Congressional Priorities,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 21, 2014), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/executive-discre
tion-and-congressional.html (“This level-of-generality problem is a standard one that arises
in all statutory interpretation . . . .”).
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with the Take Care Clause, the OLC needs to balance counterarguments,
weigh alternatives, and assess contrary evidence.180
The third principle of the OLC’s framework stated that the Executive
cannot adopt a general policy that abdicates its statutory responsibilities.181
The OLC concluded that DAPA would not amount to an abdication of statutory responsibilities because the parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs are “near
the bottom of the list of the agency’s [valid] removal priorities.”182
To enhance the third principle, the OLC should first use tools of statutory interpretation to discern if executive discretion is an abdication of statutory responsibilities. The OLC should then address whether the exercise of
executive nonenforcement discretion is substantively lawful under the relevant statutory scheme.
In the case of immigration, rather than providing a conclusive, one paragraph determination that DAPA was not an abdication of the Executive’s statutory responsibilities, a tighter analysis would have elaborated on alternative
interpretations. In particular, the OLC could delve into a discussion of the
legislative history surrounding the statute’s enactment, the surrounding statutory provisions, other statutes similar to the one at issue, and any subsequent amendments.183
Additionally, the OLC needs to address whether DAPA was substantively
unlawful under the INA. While the INA “established a ‘comprehensive federal statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization’ and
set ‘the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent
treatment of aliens lawfully in the country,’” the OLC Opinion did not properly grapple with the INA’s intricate regulatory scheme.184 The Fifth Circuit
held as an alternative holding that DAPA violated the INA under Chevron
because Congress had “addressed the precise question at issue”185 and the
INA “prescribes how parents may derive an immigration classification on the
basis of their child’s status and which classes of aliens can achieve deferred
action and eligibility for work authorization. DAPA is foreclosed by Congress’s careful plan; the program is ‘manifestly contrary to the statue’ and
therefore was properly enjoined.”186 It is beyond the DHS’s powers to pro180 Cf. Recent Executive Opinion, supra note 171, at 2327 (explaining the “ways in which
the Opinion’s limiting principle presents much thornier challenges than the OLC’s Opinion suggests”).
181 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 7.
182 Id. at 28.
183 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (discussing various methods of statutory interpretation, including the plain meaning, noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, in pari
materia, avoiding absurd results, statutory amendments, legislative history, and the rule of
lenity), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
184 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 163 n.80 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 587 (2011)), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
185 Id. at 186 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44, 52 (2011)).
186 Id. (quoting Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 53).
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vide an entire class of undocumented immigrants with lawful presence and
work authorization when Congress’s words seemed to hold the opposite is
true.187 In assessing future instances of the executive branch exercising its
nonenforcement discretion, the OLC should take a closer look at whether an
agency action is substantively unlawful.
Finally, the fourth principle posited that enforcement discretion must be
applied on a case-by-case basis.188 The OLC found that DAPA permitted
case-by-case enforcement discretion and did not “categorically declin[e] to
enforce the law with respect to a particular group of undocumented
aliens.”189
In the future, the OLC should first consider the size of the executive
nonenforcement action in its assessment of whether enforcement discretion
is made on a case-by-case basis. The OLC should next consider the time
constraints, if any, on an executive nonenforcement action as a factor in
whether enforcement discretion is made on a case-by-case basis. The OLC
should ensure that there is a definitive date by which the executive branch
will reevaluate whether its nonenforcement policy is consonant to the Take
Care Clause.
As discussed above, the OLC Opinion peripherally assessed whether
DAPA would be problematic due to its size.190 However, the OLC was conclusory in determining that size was unproblematic because immigrants eligible for DAPA represented “only a fraction” of the undocumented immigrants
in the United States.191 The OLC did not fully justify how the size of the
program affected whether enforcement discretion is made on a case-by-case
basis, and only cursorily acknowledged that millions of undocumented immigrants would be eligible for DAPA. Size should play more of a role in assessing whether enforcement discretion could be made on an individualized
basis. Additionally, the OLC Opinion did not consider how long DAPA
would last, and instead justified DAPA because the grant of deferred action is
time limited and revocable by the Agency at any time.
Each principle of the four-factor framework can be utilized to more
carefully scrutinize the President’s use of enforcement discretion in immigration and other contexts. For instance, the OLC did not publish any endorsement of DACA, so it is unknown what grounds form the basis of DACA’s
legality. The OLC only provided that DACA implemented “deferred action
on a case-by-case basis” and “the concerns animating DACA were nonetheless
consistent with the types of concerns that have customarily guided the exercise of immigration enforcement discretion.”192 The OLC framework should
be used to analyze deferred action in DACA and a variety of other domestic
policy contexts. Each time the executive branch creates a nonenforcement
187 Id. at 169.
188 OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 7.
189 Id. at 29.
190 See id. at 30–31.
191 Id. at 31.
192 Id. at 18 n.8.
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policy, the OLC should publish a detailed four-factor analysis, disclosing the
sources it relied upon to formulate its opinion. This will provide for
increased accountability and allow for the public to independently analyze
the OLC’s reasoning. An enhanced, publicly reviewable OLC framework
provides a safety valve against presidential overreach.
Additionally, the Take Care Clause may impose other internal constraints on the Executive. In its analysis, the OLC should also consider the
agency’s past actions and whether an enforcement decision is similar to
other programs it has historically undertaken as Jackson contemplated in his
Youngstown concurrence. Supplementary procedures could be grafted onto
executive enforcement discretion when agencies’ nonenforcement policies
flip-flop after an election. To prevent agency flip-flopping, the OLC should
have to provide notice of the Executive’s intent to change enforcement discretion policies. The OLC should be required to issue a detailed report justifying the President’s change in position on enforcement discretion. This
analysis should consider factors such as whether there was a change in facts
or whether a prior policy “engendered . . . reliance interests.”193 While the
President is not an agency and certainly is not constrained by the APA,194
parallel agency constraints may prove useful for the executive branch to exercise self-control. An agency switching its nonenforcement policy should
“show that there are good reasons for the new policy.”195 The OLC should
analyze whether and how much a change in policy will upset reliance interests so that there are substantive internal constraints within the executive
branch. The OLC should utilize its multifactor framework with the above
suggestions incorporated to constrain the executive branch.
CONCLUSION
How to best prevent abuses of executive discretion is a pressing question.
Presidents have been using nonenforcement to effectively amend statutory
policies. Because the other branches fail to adequately cabin executive discretion, the executive branch must apply internal constraints in order to be
in conformity with its Take Care obligations. The Executive is not acting
upon the faithful execution of the law by selectively choosing not to enforce
the law in accordance with particular policy preferences. The OLC Opinion
provides a useful starting point for thinking about how the executive branch
193 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). While an
agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate[,] [s]ometimes it must—when,
for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which
underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account.
Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
194 See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994) (explaining that a President is not an
agency under the APA and is therefore not subject to the APA requirements).
195 Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515.
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can comport with its Take Care Clause duty to faithfully enforce the law. It
can be improved by providing a more detailed analysis of the four prongs as
outlined in the OLC Opinion and elaborated in Part IV.

